Is There a Limit to the Mitzvah of Honoring Parents

Question: Throughout life, it is inevitable for situations to arise where there is a difference of opinion between a child and a parent (e.g., school choice for grandchild, medical decisions, shidduchim, finances, etc.). Does kibbud av v’eim require that I adhere to my parents’ opinions across the board, or perhaps there is a limit?

Answer by Rabbi Mendel Prescott, Rosh Yeshiva of Machon Smicha:

The question of a limit in kibbud av v’eim is addressed in the Gemara,[1] which asks, “Ad heichan kibbud av v’eim?”—how far does the obligation extend? The Gemara answers by relating the famous story of Dama ben Nesinah, who sacrificed a fortune in order to avoid waking his father. The Gemara means to illustrate that when kibbud av v’eim is applicable, it indeed has no limits, and one must undergo much burden and difficulties to fulfill it. Nevertheless, the Mitzva is subject to certain parameters that limit the cases where it applies.

The early poskim debate whether kibbud av v’eim applies in cases where a parent requests something from a child that does not directly benefit the parent. Some Rishonim[2] say that since the Torah indicates no differentiation, kibbud av v’eim applies universally. However, the Maharik[3] argues that the examples given in the Gemara—such as feeding or clothing a parent—imply that kibbud av v’eim is only applicable to acts that personally benefit a parent.

The Maharik’s ruling involves a case in which a father forbade his son from marrying the woman whom he chose to marry. He permits the man to ignore his father’s directive because it doesn’t relate to the father’s personal needs. (He adds two other reasons to permit, but those reasons apply only to marriage). The Rama[4] brings the Maharik’s ruling as halacha. (Though, it is unclear whether he intended to permit it only in marriage cases relying only on the other two reasons, or for other circumstances as well.)

The Sefer HaMakneh[5] agrees with the Maharik in theory but explains that this parameter only applies to kibud av v’eim, but not to morah av v’eim. Morah—counted as a separate mitzvah—requires a child to show reverence towards a parent, such as refraining from contradicting them. Ignoring a parent’s command regardless of the context, is akin to contradicting their words and is therefore forbidden. So, in practice, argues the Makneh, one must heed all requests of a parent.

The Chazon Ish[6] holds a similar view, but with one caveat: For matters that do not have any connection whatsoever to a parent (such as a child’s personal financial decisions), ignoring a parent’s command is not even a violation of morah. But matters that may have an emotional effect on a parent (like a child’s marriage choices) must be followed even though the parent doesn’t benefit from it. Such matters can cause pain to a parent when their command is unheeded and is thus subject to the mitzva of morah. He explains that the Maharik’s hetter was mainly based on the other two reasons.

The Shevet HaLevi[7] differs from the Chazon Ish’s opinion and assumes that each of the Maharik’s reasons are independently sufficient. As a result, he applies the Maharik’s principle not only to cases of marriage, but to all matters that don’t benefit a parent directly.

Interestingly, the Midrash[8] praises Eisav’s high level of kibbud av, while at the same time his marriage choices are described in the passuk as a source of bitter grief to his parents.[9] This aligns well with the Maharik’s ruling that marriage choices are not bound by the chuyiv of kibbud av. (Though, perhaps Eisav was only concerned with kibbud av and not morah av which may be why he felt no issue with contradicting his father’s wishes while simultaneously affording him proper honor.)

Although a full discussion is beyond the scope here, it is worth briefly noting another possible exception to kibbud av v’eim: The Terumas Hadeshen[10] says that matters of ruchniyus aren’t subject to kibbud av v’eim. He illustrates this with Yaakov Avinu, who wasn’t punished for the years spent studying at the yeshiva of Shem and Eiver, despite being away from his parents.[11] He adds even a direct command of a parent can be ignored if done to prioritize one’s own spiritual growth. The Shulchan Aruch[12] brings this l’halacha. The Chamudei Daniel[13] goes further that, even without being certain that he will succeed in his own choice, a child may override his parent’s decision in matters of ruchniyus. But in practice, one should seek guidance by a Rov, as it is not for an individual to determine what falls under this exception.

[1] קידושין (לא, א)
[2] רש”י יבמות (ו, א) כמו שדקדק שם הריטב”א. וע”ע בשו”ת הרא”ש (כלל טו סימן ה).
[3] שו”ת מהרי”ק (סימן קסו)
[4] יו”ד סימן רמ (סעיף כה)
[5] קידושין (לא, ב)
[6] יו”ד סימן קמט (ס”ק ח)
[7] חלק ד (סימן קכד)
[8] שמות רבה פ’ כי תשא (פ’ מו סימן ד)
[9] בראשית (כו, לה)
[10] חלק א (סימן מ)
[11] מס’ מגילה (טז, ב)
[12] יו”ד סימן רמ (סעיף כה)
[13] הובא בפתחי תשובה (שם ס”ק כב), ראה באגרות קודש (חלק יב עמוד מט)